

PRIVATIZATION OF WAR: THE CHALLENGES AND THE QUESTION OF FLEXIBILITY FOR THE ARMY

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Abstract: The paper focuses on the contemporary trend of privatization of security and warfare. Increasingly, the states set regulations for the engagement of private military companies (PMCs) in various military services in exchange for financial compensation. This paper treats PMCs as non-state actors regulated by the state in which they are registered but with missions designated to foreign states. The main premise is that the privatization of warfare and PMCs nevertheless create great challenges for the traditional understanding of the state-run governance of the military sphere. Consequently, it is a challenge for the conduct of global security and foreign policy in general. In this analysis, we contextualize the research problem and analyse it through the Macedonian prism. The academic community, as well as the practitioners, have not detected this problem yet, mostly because the state does not allow the formation of PMCs yet. We argue that that position is one-sided because the global trend of privatization of warfare and military services affects all states through the logic of a market for a force that disregards state borders and regulations. Therefore, an attempt is made to get insights into the question of how the privatization of warfare affects the reform processes as well as the military staff of the Macedonian Army.

Keywords: privatization of warfare, private military and security companies, outsourcing, military functions

INTRODUCTION

Ensuring security has traditionally been considered the most significant function of the state, especially seen through the Weberian definition of the state as the bearer of the monopoly on the use of force and the maintenance of the security sector. However, the development of the process of privatization of war and warfare is so booming that it has a significant impact on both security theory and practice, as well as on the behaviour of states. Thus, the state loses the status of being the exclusive holder of the security function through the police and the military as institutions due to the emergence of other non-state security actors. Part of the explanation for this trend is the complexity of new security challenges for which countries are not prepared enough, so they use additional assistance and cooperation coming from the private sector, whether it is for internal or external security. However, it is crucial to note that general (economic) liberalization and privatization have also entered the security sphere. The general trend is also under the influence of the steady pace of global militarization and military conflicts and tensions worldwide. Especially democratic states, i.e., those in which public opinion is not in the mood for the use of military force worldwide, find

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a way out of the outsourcing operation, i.e., by delegating their military missions to other executors and (covert) national or corporate interests. Private actors (both non-state and commercial) often operate in conjunction with state security agencies but can sometimes become their rivals.

Private actors in the security sphere mainly appear in two forms: as military or security companies. They offer their services to those who want and can pay for their expertise, so the clients are not only the authorities of the country that registered them, but also foreign regimes, corporations, or international governmental or non-governmental organizations. Experts believe that the demand for their services will increase due to the need for alternative ways to deal with security challenges. Numerous studies show a continuous increase in the number of employees in private military and security companies (PMSCs). Such a boom in the private security industry has raised its status as an independent security entity. The first goal of this analysis of PMSCs is to place them in the broader context of security privatization. The first assumption from the analysis is that PMSCs are relatively independent institutions, and the second is that they are undergoing rapid historical development. In addition to the first assumption, are their characteristics? Namely, PMSCs have become an inherent part of the security sphere, nationally or internationally. It is true that they evolve and change through interactions with the public, state, and international actors, but also with other private security actors. PMSCs are a product of a lack of state capacity or a willingness to engage openly in various missions as well as new generations of warfare and threats. In fulfilling the set goals or undertaking obligations, they are in commercial cooperation not only with state institutions but with all clients willing to pay for their expertise. This ambivalent position of PMSCs requires national and international regulations, i.e., supervision over their operations, which is a great challenge.

Historical facts are discussed in favour of the second assumption that PMSCs go through a specific development. Although the privatization of warfare is as old a phenomenon as the social organization of humanity, in its modern form, PMSCs, were institutionalized after the Cold War. Just like the classical military and police, PMSCs are a product of given social, economic, political, and other factors. The second goal of this paper is to analyse the issue of flexibility and adaptability in terms of the impact of private industry on the Army. Flexibility is analysed through insight into primary documents related to the regulation and outsourcing of military services. In this context, we start with two arguments. First, the legal vacuum that exists in domestic legislation related to private military companies needs to be filled based on professional analysis and the insertion of lessons learned internationally. Second, it is necessary to explore the logistical possibilities and intangible services provided by PMSCs, i.e., the potential contractual relationship between public and private actors. In short, the entry of private capital into defence is a matter of time.

Factors for the occurrence and development of PMSCs

The question “Why?” gets significant attention. What are the reasons for the emergence of the private market in force? Next, the scrutiny of causes and factors through the prism of different time epochs follows. In the historical context, the engagement of people to achieve other people’s military goals has been present since ancient times (Brnardić, 2009), i.e., a phenomenon as old as war. The need for mercenaries decreased in the 19th

century when countries introduced compulsory military service. However, to some extent, the principle of replacing the regular forces with engaged support has been retained (Scheimer, 2009). The expansion of mercenaries is related to the period of anti-colonial and national liberation wars after the Second World War. The United Kingdom and France explicitly used them and were always classified as illegal participants. Namely, mercenaries had legitimacy only shortly after World War II, when they were widely used in Africa. After that, they were deprived of the status of legal combatants by the Additional Protocol to the 1977 Geneva Convention. Private military companies are registered and have different statuses depending on the specific relationship with the country (Sheeny, Maogoto, Newell, 2009).

However, the end of the Cold War stands out as the most striking period, stating that the main reasons for the occurrence of PMSCs are the reduction of personnel in the armies, increased sales of military equipment and weapons, as well as the development of economic liberalism, followed by mass privatization of state services in all spheres. The great human potential in the form of military experts and veterans, especially from countries that had to reduce the composition of their traditional armies preparing for a frontal war with the enemy from the other ideological-political and military bloc, created a chance to develop new business. That seems like a win-win situation. The second significant period for increased use of PMSCs is the one that begins with the events after 9/11, i.e., during and after the military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq (O'Brien, 2000). The main reasons are the increase in low-intensity conflicts and asymmetric and hybrid threats, the need to professionalize warfare, the influence of public opinion (the electorate), and the pressure on governments due to the suffering of personnel from regular army structures.

The term private military company (PMC) dates back to the 1990s and is not just related to the Iraq war (Bakreski, 2015). However, in international documents and conventions, it has been found since 2006. The first PMC was founded in the UK in 1967 under the name Watch Guard International (the reason for its occurrence is political or it is related to the events in Yemen). It was composed of former members of the British Special Services (SAS-Special Air Service) and later became an example of founding other companies in the world. The position of private military companies varies from country to country. Some countries outsource various functions in the security field and intelligence (USA, Russia, and Canada). Countries like China, France, and Israel use their services, but with a monopoly of state structures over the entrusted security functions. Countries like Germany, Italy, and Spain retain the monopoly of state institutions but tolerate the existence of private security companies. Today, there are more than 100 private military companies in the world offering their services in over 50 countries. The United States and the United Kingdom cover 75% of the global market for private military services, and their beneficiaries are individuals, NGOs, countries, and international corporations. Some of the bigger ones are Blackwater (Academi LLC), DynCorp, Armor Group, G4S, etc.

Concept, definition, and classification of PMSCs

The need for definition is imposed due to the imprecise terminology in use and for differentiation of various non-state security features. The term "private security industry" is used as a common denominator of the various private companies engaged in the security sphere and warfare, which in itself speaks of their number and (physical and financial)

power. In terms of their regulation, two international mechanisms stand out. The Montreux Document was not adopted until 2008 and is an agreement on relevant international legal obligations and good practices for states related to PMSC operations during armed conflict. The second document is the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC), adopted in 2010. From both documents, we can conclude that they treat them as entities providing military and/or security services, independently or on behalf of other actors, regardless of how they describe themselves (ICoC, 2010; The Montreux Document, 2008). There are many definitions of PMC in the literature. According to one, it is a "registered civilian company specializing in providing military training, military support operations (logistical support), operational combat capabilities (engagement of special forces, command and control, communications and intelligence) and providing military equipment to legitimate domestic and foreign entities" (Goddard, 2001). Others define them as "business organizations that offer specialized services related to war and conflict, and whose primary purpose is to profit by providing military services in the fields of counselling, logistics, and combat activities." They are then defined as "business providers of professional services directly related to the conduct of the war" (Singer, 2004). Furthermore, they are defined as "companies that provide services that previously belonged to the state military and include military training, intelligence, logistics, offensive warfare, and security in conflict zones for profit" (Schreier, Caparini, 2005). Consequently, "private military companies are companies that specialize in military skills, including combat operations, strategic planning, intelligence gathering, operational support, logistics, training, equipment supply, and the maintenance of weapons and other equipment" (Shulz, et al., 2008). Based on these definitions, it can be concluded that PMCs are profit-oriented organizations with a business structure that offer professional services in the fields of armed conflict management, consulting, and logistical support. Their main purpose is to increase and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the armed forces in waging war or to lead the armed conflict in the direction desired by the client (Litavski, 2012). However, it is important to say that, according to the definitions, the essence is not based on the consequences of their actions but mainly on the characteristics, factors, processes, and actors that create security.

PMCs can range from small consulting firms to transnational corporations where the question arises as to who they account for and who controls them. In addition to military interventions in various forms in political and ethnic hotspots, they can also be engaged in limited interventions, either for purely economic or social reasons. International organizations (UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP, and others), as well as various non-governmental organizations, can appear as clients (Avant, 2005).

The classic classification of private actors is twofold (Avant, 2005). Private military companies (PMCs) are registered corporate bodies with legal entities that offer military and security services of various natures and for purposes other than those of mercenaries. Services include combat operations and operational support, military advisory and training, weapons procurement, logistical support, intelligence gathering, etc. Private security companies (PSCs) have the same corporate features and command structures as PMCs, and the main difference is in the services they offer. Preventing crime and ensuring public order and peace are the main focus. They also offer security services for prisons, airports, infrastructure facilities, and private individuals. Avant rightly proposes unique terminology, so he names these actors by the generic name of private security companies (Vankovska, 2011). Avant moves on to

conceptual issues and raises questions about what it means to enter into contracts with PSCs for the state (according to the type of contracts signed) and its control over the legitimate force. She also notes that all contractors working for private companies have acquired their skills with the help of the state.

Peter Singer made an influential typology in which the determinant is the war zone, i.e., the distance to the battlefield. Thus, military providers are companies that provide military services and have the closest proximity to the battlefield. Military consulting firms provide consulting and training, strategic, operational, and organizational analysis, and education, but do not operate on the battlefield. The last element is military support firms, created as companies providing additional military services, such as non-lethal assistance, logistics, intelligence, technical support, and transportation (Singer, 2008). It also states that top-down privatization takes place within the security sector, which is conducted by governments and results in the outsourcing of military and police functions to private companies. It turns out that the industry for PMSCs covers a multitude of services and does not simply deal with armed services, sketching future places for business development. These are intangible services or support services based on skills that have both military and civilian applications. The intelligence market is one such example. While there is a clear difference between providing security services like securing prisons or advising and training police forces in Iraq, Croatia, or Saudi Arabia, PMSCs challenge the traditional line between the military sector (armies) and security (police forces) by applying their services in both areas. Because it is difficult to represent different market interests, this paper will use the term “private military and security companies” to cover both areas, with all its conceptual inaccuracies.

PMSCs in the context of different paradigms

Due to the lack of a specific theoretical framework, privatization security and war scientists often lend ideas on social contracts as well as paradigms on neoliberal public governance frameworks (Krahmann, 2010). Hence, the first methodological approach to the study of PMSCs is the institutional one, which presents them as institutions involved in the implementation of public interests. The liberal concept recognizes the important role of international institutions, various entities, and non-state actors (including PMSCs) and assumes that decision-making is influenced not only by state interests (Davydov, 2002). Although cooperation and collective security are priority areas for liberalism, these phenomena are not considered separately from conflicts. For example, PMSCs have begun to enter the market of power and cooperation, especially with countries seeking their help in exchange for profit, and where the international community shows no particular interest in intervening. But international organizations have also begun to hire PMSCs to protect their staff and humanitarian operations threatened by developments on the ground (Gumedze, 2011). A classic example is the inclusion of PMSCs in UN-sponsored missions in Africa. UNICEF, UNHCR, UNDP and the UN Procurement Department, are among the largest UN bodies concluding contracts with PMSCs (Bianchetti, 2016).

The neoliberal model starts from the changes that took place in the late 1970s when the privatization of various spheres of life gained momentum, a multitude of functions are being transferred to different levels of contractors and public-private partnerships have expanded globally (Nebolsina, 2014). For this model, it is important what resources and

capabilities a country have at its disposal to manage the processes in the security field. He acknowledges the integration of additional forces into the security system but does not say that the state arsenal is being replenished in proportion to new capabilities. In the paradigm of political neorealism, PMSCs are a new tool that complements diplomacy and force-based strategy as a means of protecting and promoting the country's geopolitical interests (Tsygankov, 2011). The concept of neorealism allows any action if it is beneficial to the state (Pugachev, Solovyov, 2002). In this sense, PMSCs are "an important national security factor and social partner of the country" (Semenova, 2012). Although the phenomenon of PMSCs is mainly associated with the Western world, it is still important to emphasize the spread of this phenomenon in countries such as Russia and China.

Army and privatization of warfare

In this part of the paper, the focus is on the research question regarding the effects of war privatization on the Macedonian defence sector. The Macedonian Army is constitutionally and legally defined as an armed force that aims to protect the country from external threats and aggression. The function of the military is built around the concept of war, where the military is either engaged in combat or preparing for it (Coker, 2007). However, with the participation of the Army in various foreign missions, its role gradually evolved. Currently, the context in which the military operates tends to external orientation, i.e., participation in peacekeeping missions abroad, especially after NATO membership.

However, the participation of army members in peacekeeping operations during deployment in different countries led to the establishment of direct contact and cooperation with PMSCs. The context in which the military operates in those operations is characterized by a public-private security link. The merger of army members with private contractors led to a shift in the military role, initially from an individual to a collective aspect.

The attention of the domestic public, primarily the employees of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Army, as well as foreign factors (military and civilian), closely monitor the interaction between the military and other actors as it consists of domestic and international public opinion. Thus, modern security issues are transversal, i.e., they are not contained in only one country. As threats become more and more transnational, the military has long played a dual role. Above all, it prepares against external threats and armed aggression but helps reduce internal security risks. That multidimensionality poses challenges to the current military role and raises the question of flexibility and other issues. The traditional defence role against external aggressors is not outdated but faces the imperative of greater flexibility in adapting to non-state security entities. Based on the theoretical framework, the military role of the Army itself is subject to change. The first change is inherent, that is, the self-evolving aspect that the army itself has, which arises primarily from human resources, technology, threats, etc. The second change is due to the influence of other actors or security entities (internal or external). Those other actors include politics, public opinion, as well as private security entities. Politics decide the time, place, and manner of use of military means. Direct or indirect influence on the military by the actors affects the domain and the expectations of the military. All these increase if an external actor is involved in the influence.

The MoD and the Army already have experience with military privatization. The Army gained its first experience in the period before the conflict that is, in the period from 1998 to

2001, when the US private military company MPRI was involved in defence reform, conducting training, advising, and mentoring army units.⁵³

However, for this analysis, the meetings of army participants in military missions with foreign PMSCs abroad are more significant, which in certain situations led to an outflow of part of the professional staff due to financial motives. This tendency increases proportionally with the growth of the market and its need for trained staff, which results in the opening of new jobs (contractors). Professional military personnel, for various reasons (economic, social, political, and personal), decide to leave the Army and join private military and security companies in different parts of the world.

In the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) from 2018, item 8.1 states that from 2012, more Army personnel left the Army than were admitted, a situation that is not sustainable in the long run. One of the reasons is the competition from the private sector. If this trend continues, it will be a negative and worrying phenomenon because the state loses some of its best professionals and state structures weaken, but it also affects national security. Furthermore, point 8.2 mentions the security of military facilities performed by Army members, which is not the best way to use trained soldiers, which indirectly implies a connection with the security privatization process. There are no provisions in the domestic legislation that would apply to the PMC, but there is legislation for private security agencies and detective activity. Both activities are regulated by special laws, that is, the Law on Private Security and the Law on Detective Activity. This speaks to a legal loophole that should eventually be regulated or a lack of political will in the country to form a PMC.

Article 55 of the Constitution clearly stipulates that freedom of the market and entrepreneurship are guaranteed. The Republic ensures the equal legal position of all entities on the market. The Republic takes measures against monopoly positions and monopolistic behaviour in the market. Freedom of the market and entrepreneurship can be restricted by law only for the defence of the Republic, the preservation of nature, the environment, or human health.

In the Law on Defence, in Chapter I, Article 1, the Army is strictly determined for the realization of the defence of the Republic, that is, the guarantor of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state. Item 9 of Article 41 stipulates that active military and civilian personnel, members of the Army Reserve Forces, and employees of the Ministry of Defence may participate in exercises, training, humanitarian operations, and international operations, in NATO missions and operations, and operations in the exercise of the right to individual or collective self-defence, as well as in operations for crisis management and cooperative security outside the territory of the Republic.

In the Defence Strategy of 2020, item 35 clearly states that the defence system consists of: military component, the main carrier of which is the Armed Forces, that is, the Army, and a non-military component composed of other state institutions that have a share in dealing with security threats and risks, local self-government bodies, public enterprises, and companies, and citizens, as defined by the Law on Defence.

Furthermore, in the Law on Public Procurement of 2019, Article 19 prescribes public procurement that includes aspects of defence and security. In the Law on Public Procurement in the Field of Defence and Security from 2019, Article 4 (application) stipulates that the

⁵³ <https://www.upi.com/Archives/2002/07/17/Analysis-Private-armies-1/2451026878400/?u3L=1>
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law applies to contracts awarded in the field of defence and security for: a) procurement of military equipment, including components and sets of equipment; b) procurement of security-sensitive equipment, including parts, components, and/or components of the equipment; c) works, goods, and services directly related to the equipment referred to in points a) and b) of this paragraph for any or all elements of its service life; d) works and services exclusively for military purposes or security-sensitive works and services and e) services or works for special military purposes. (2) The Government of the Republic of North Macedonia shall determine the list of goods referred to in paragraph (1) of this Article.

The Law on Development Production and Trade of Military Equipment from 2021 refers to the regulation of the conditions for the development, production, and trade of military equipment as activities of interest for the defence and security of the Republic of North Macedonia. Article 6 stipulates that the development of military goods is done by people who have received consent from the government to carry out the development of military goods in accordance with the law. People who have received permission from the Ministry to trade in military goods in accordance with the law and a license from the law are allowed to trade in military goods. Article 7 stipulates that foreign legal entities based on an investment program may, with prior consent, invest funds in domestic legal entities registered for the development and production of military goods. The previous two articles allow the entry of private (military and security) companies, normally with prior checking and approval. It is important to note that PMSCs are legally established by concluding cooperation agreements with the government, international organizations, and multinational corporations.

Another limitation to forming a private military company, in a narrower sense, is the Law on Weapons of 2005. To carry out combat operations or other military activities in crisis areas, the company should equip and arm its employees with military weapons. Namely, military weapons are categorized in category A: prohibited weapons, which means that private companies and civilians cannot have such weapons. Article 4 of the Law and all amendments to the Law prescribe that the weapons according to the classification in the Law are in category A, that is, weapons whose procurement is prohibited. The classification includes: 1) explosive military missiles and launch systems; 2) automatic firearms; 3) firearms disguised in the form of another object; 4) ammunition with penetrating missiles, ammunition with explosive missiles, ammunition with flammable missiles, and missiles for that ammunition; 5) ammunition for pistols and revolvers with expanding action missiles and missiles for that ammunition, except ammunition used in hunting or sporting weapons; 6) firearms with built-in silencers; 7) firearms with grooved barrels and calibres greater than 12.7 mm; 8) explosive weapons and their components; 9) gas weapons and gas weapon ammunition; 10) firearms special equipment; 11) electric paralyzers; 12) marking ammunition; 13) firearms made from main parts of firearms obtained through illegal trade; 14) new firearms produced without marking by the regulations for testing and stamping, i.e., marking; and 15) remade or modified weapons.

Article 2 of the Law on Private Security stipulates that private security is an activity of the public interest, which regulates the area in which it operates, its powers, protection of data and information, supervision, and the application of operational methods in acting. Article 4 states that legal entities with a private security license may not provide people or property provided by competent state bodies in accordance with special regulations.

Accordingly, with the current legislation, the Army cannot hire a private security company to protect military facilities, which is contrary to the idea in item 8.2 of the SDR.

According to the provisions, it follows that the MoD is obliged to take care of the listed activities and cannot completely leave them to an internal or external contractor, but the provision where there is room for cooperation and use of internal and external contractors is important. Accordingly, the private security sector cannot, without a prior agreement, obtain powers and competencies in areas regulated by state security entities (military, police, customs, etc.).

Hence, it is not yet possible to establish a PMC in the narrow sense, a company that would perform typical military activities such as protecting military facilities, supporting combat operations, and even fewer combat operations for itself. The same sector can support and cooperate with the public sector by the regulations that should follow the regional and world regulations in that domain. Another important part is because the private security industry touches on state structures, sovereignty, and other important state issues related to national security. Any political, social, economic, and ideological propaganda by private security entities, as well as the elimination of the private sector's ability to compete with the army and police, should be legally regulated and prohibited. Outsourcing is the transfer of hostilities or the hiring of private executors by state structures (Vankovska, 2011). Practically speaking, it is a release of financial, material, and human resources. In that part, the Army has its own experience. Like most armed forces, the Army is not a self-sufficient organization. That means that it largely depends on external contractors in the logistics field. This area was one of the first in which cooperation was established between military and private entities, demonstrating public-private partnership in the security field. The increasing influence of external state factors to assist in building institutions has led to reduced costs and better service. This group also includes military consulting companies, which, in addition to cooperating in procurement and planning, also offer security consulting, training, and force transformation. The most commonly outsourced activities are in the areas of nutrition, construction, armaments, military equipment, communications, etc. Thus, soldiers can commit to regular military tasks that adequately contribute to increasing combat readiness. The exception to outsourcing is military activity itself, because it is the exclusive task of the state. The two-sided nature of the process means that the Army gradually loses certain knowledge and skills from a logistical point of view and then becomes dependent on the private sector. It is a lesson learned from other countries where, due to inappropriate behaviour and non-delivery of quality by the contractor, the safety of soldiers and the success of missions are endangered (Petersohn, 2010).

From the point of view of military-civil relations, the external outsourcing of services in the armed forces means both deterioration and improvement of relations. With the privatization of support activities, troops are only involved in combat training and military operations. It contributes to the distance from the general culture in society, developing its subculture. On the other hand, the entry of private entities, civil society organizations, and their employees into the military environment, such as barracks, training grounds, and military facilities, contributes to increasing the number of contacts between the military and civilian environment, thus maintaining the coherence of the military and civilian environment. By undertaking military tasks such as logistics, training, and intelligence by private security entities, the armed forces are gaining more time and resources to deal with key combat tasks.

In the debate on the appropriateness of military privatization, the most important arguments are the quality and price of outsourcing services. Supporters of private military companies claim they can provide the same services more cheaply than the state armed forces.

The Army's experience is obvious in the logistic fields, education, training, and exercises. Diverting from non-core tasks is no longer an option in the Long-Term Defence Capability Development Plan (LTDCDP) 2019–2028. Objective 55 stipulates that there is a need to divert non-essential activities related to food, catering, and accommodation services, hygiene, physical security, and ongoing maintenance of facilities and infrastructure. Getting rid of these non-essential functions for the defence will enable reduction, that is, appropriate allocation of staff and better organization for the performance of basic functions. The proposed divestiture models go in the direction of transferring the non-core activities to a public enterprise, public-private partnership, granting a concession, or other contractual solution.

In terms of the supply of armaments, ammunition, and equipment, the state buys them on the open market or receives them as a donation. The donation of weapons and the purchase of uniforms are some of the latest examples of this. We have companies that produce military equipment, ammunition, and certain components for armed systems, but we do not have our own production of military weapons in the country. Also, some companies deal with the import, export, and sale of military equipment and weapons. All these companies must be properly registered by the law and have the necessary permits to carry out their activities. As stated by the MoD, starting in 2022, members of the Army, primarily those who are part of the Light Infantry Battle Group, and from 2023, throughout the entire Army, will receive meals throughout the year through an external company for which a public procurement tender has been announced. ([1] Furthermore, the MoD hires private entities for the needs of technical maintenance of vehicles and certain military equipment for which it has no experience and cannot maintain. The MoD and the Army cooperate with external and internal public and private companies in the education field and training. The Military Academy, as a provider of military education and training as well as a scientific research institution, regularly cooperates with domestic and foreign educational institutions and units of the Army. Some of those institutions are the Faculty of Civil Engineering, the Faculty of Electrical Engineering, and Information Technologies, as well as centres for taking the driving test. Also, the intercity organized transport of members of the MoD and the Army is private. In cooperation with civil education institutions, the highest forms of education are implemented, as is the case with postgraduate studies at the Faculty of Security. The Army also cooperates with external forces in the field of training. Training is conducted in the form of joint training and exchange of knowledge, as well as in the form of courses in the countries of the region and the world. Due to the lack of personnel in certain areas, the MoD and the Army employ civilian personnel such as doctors, lawyers, and electrical engineers who, after appropriate announcement and training, enter the ranks of the military.

We can summarize that the MoD and the Army cooperate with external companies, especially in the area of logistical support, but also in the fields of education and training. External contractors and domestic private entities participate in the support as maintainers, service providers, and service providers and not as providers of physical security for military facilities, because, as already mentioned, the law does not allow it.

Conclusion

The increasing use of PMSCs has an appropriate theoretical and legitimate framework of action because it is in line with the theory of the postmodern armed forces. Through the paper, it became clear that security is no longer an a priori function of the state. Private security entities are an inherent part of the modern security context. Predictions are that PMSCs will not disappear soon, but on the contrary, there is a tendency to develop.

PMSCs are a significant factor in the modern system of international relations. They have a dual function because what for some countries is the implementation of their interests (instrumental nature), for others is interference in internal affairs and a violation of statehood. In both cases, the security functions are in the hands of the PMSCs as a substitute for direct state involvement. The Macedonian Army can be said to be following the trend of privatization and security. Flexibility is necessary to effectively protect different entities from threats and maintain cooperation with a larger number of partners. Based on that, the threats facing the Army are hybrid and require rapid action and adaptation. Another significant part is the approach to the threats themselves and the use of violence. Expectations for flexibility in the use of violence are even higher. Third, the need for flexibility is important because of the close cooperation with other security actors. The scope of cooperation with private security entities is much larger and deeper in the modern security context. The armed forces must be sufficiently adaptable to operate independently but also under the command of other security entities.

Private security is an alternative for many retired or active police or army professionals. Many decide to leave the Army to work for foreign contractor companies for financial gain. Some of them stay in the country, but again in the security field. The outflow of professional personnel from the Army reduces combat readiness and systemic knowledge. With the current regulations and laws, the important part is that, for the time being, a private military company cannot be established in the country. Cooperation with private entities is in the logistic field, regulated according to the previously mentioned laws. For further collaboration with private entities (internal or external), it is necessary to make a professionally independent cost analysis to examine the quality and benefits.

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