

## **SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION IN EUROPEAN UNION AND THE ROLE OF PRIVATE SECURITY FIRMS**

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### **Abstract**

This paper considers the relationship between migration, immigration policies of the European Union, the securitization of migration and their impact on the expansion of private security firms engaged in various migration control tasks. The paper starts from the theory of securitization of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies and analyzes the extent to which the issue of migration in the European Union is securitized. Subsequently, the process of securitization of migration is linked to the private security sector and its role in the control of migration is analyzed. This paper addresses trends and the impact of the migration process on the private security sector. The issue of migration in the European Union is significantly securitized and this process has led to an increase in demand for services provided by the private security sector. On the other hand, there have been serious allegations against the private security firms concerning the violation of the human rights of migrants. This issue is significant regarding the role of private security firms engaged in migration control tasks.

**Keywords:** migration, European Union, securitization, private security firms.

### **Introduction**

Migration is one of the key modern security challenges that the European Union has been facing since its inception. Following the Second World War, the reasons for migration to Europe were primarily economic in nature that created the need for foreign labor. Today, these are primarily political reasons, major structural inequalities between developed and underdeveloped countries, the conflicts in the Middle East and other regions of the world. These processes have

triggered a migrant wave toward European Union countries. The securitization of migration implies the social construction of migrations as a security threat of great and existential significance for the European Union and European culture as a whole. Such a discourse has the effect of establishing special measures in the form of restrictive immigration policies and the mobilization of institutional capacity for action. Responses to the new situation are complex, leading to the engagement and expansion of private security firms regarding the issues that traditionally fell within the competence of the state, such as the management of asylum centers or refugee camps. Such practices open up the issues of accountability and oversight, as well as the issues of violations of the human rights of migrants by employees in private firms. Private security firms, as one of the actors of the securitization of migrations, draw political legitimacy from the ideology of neoliberalism. The emergence and growth of the private security sector has been explained by various factors, primarily by the rise in crime and fear of it, the rise in private property and economic reasons, the overburdening of the police forces (Shearing & Stenning, 1981; Steden, 2007), as well as the engagement of private security firms in conflict regions (Singer, 2003; Leander, 2005; Singer, 2008) in order to fill the resulting security vacuum in unstable, as is often referred to as “failed countries” (Chomsky, 2007). In previous surveys in the field of private security, the impact of migration on the private security sector has not been addressed, but given the current trends and migration crisis, this aspect is becoming more and more important.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the link between migration, immigration policies in the European Union, the securitization of migrations and their impact on the private security sector.

The issue of migration and immigration policies in the European Union are briefly presented in the following section. Then the securitization theory is discussed with a special emphasis on the problem of securitization of migrations followed by an analysis of the impact of securitization of migration on the private security sector and the privatization of migration control.

### **Migration and Immigration Policy in the European Union**

The migration of the population from economically under developed and politically unstable countries to the countries in Western Europe has been a continuing process since the end of the Second World War. Although modern migration to Europe is often viewed from this distance, they are not exclusively a phenomenon that relates to the postwar period and have long historical roots. The colonial past of European countries has had significant implications for the changing demographic and cultural image of Europe.

Considering migrations from other continents to Europe until the First World War, this process was limited. Only a small number of people from Asia, America or Africa immigrated to European countries. At the same time, as European countries colonized much of the territory beyond the old continent, migration to Europe, especially for the population of the colonies, were

extremely difficult in terms of immigration restrictions imposed by European countries (Emmer & Lucassen, 2012). Such double standards point to the fact that Europe has implemented colonial policies across its borders, while at home it was closed and distrustful to people from other cultures.

Considering migrations as a social phenomenon, we notice that in the last few decades they have changed their nature and dynamics. We may reasonably say that this process developed in phases, and each phase was determined by specific economic, social, cultural, demographic, political, and security causes and effects. There are various segments of migration movements to Europe since the end of the Second World War to date in the scientific literature (Seilonen, 2016, Martiniello: 2006, Garson & Loizillon 2003). The process of migration may be divided into certain phases based on the historical, economic and political causes and the geographical origin of migrants who have immigrated to European countries, especially to the economically most developed member states that have always been the desired destination for migrants. Following the Second World War, migration has become a current issue. The war-torn Europe faced the need for economic recovery and construction that created the need for cheap labor primarily from southern Europe, the Balkans, and Turkey. These are the beginning or the first phase of migration to Europe. The second phase was marked by the influx of the population from former colonies after the Second World War. The process of decolonization triggered a wave of migration to European countries. Domicile population from European colonies was settled in Europe, most of whom had never lived in Europe nor visited a European country. The largest number of migrants arrived from French colonies in North Africa (1.8), Portuguese colonies in Africa (about 1 million), Dutch colonies in East India (300,000), and a small number from British and Belgian colonies in Africa and Asia (Emmer & Lucassen, 2012). The third phase of migration was characterized by a high influx of asylum seekers, refugees, and ethnic minorities during the late 1980s until the outbreak of a migrant crisis due to the war in Syria.

Armed conflicts in the Middle East, Syria and Iraq, a high influx of migrants from Asian countries and Africa created the greatest migrant crisis that Europe has faced since the end of the Second World War. The migrant crisis that culminated in 2015 with its consequences is significantly different from the previous migration phenomena that European countries faced. Generally, terrorist threats, an increase in Islamic fundamentalism, a high influx of refugees has created anti-immigrant feelings, xenophobia and the rise of populist movements (Seilonen, 2016) and the strengthening of the right-wing politics onto the European political scene regarding migration (Wodak, Khosravini & Mral: 2013; Carter, 2013).

The two processes run parallel in Europe: A constant influx of migrants and a constant restrictive policy toward "outsiders" who want to settle on the European soil. It has been noted that during the colonial expansion, Europe was much closed to the colonists who intended to settle in the Old Continent. The restrictive immigration policies of European countries are present in the historical continuum and in different legal and technical ways have adapted to the intensity of migration movements and potential threats to European culture. If we analyze migration into Europe after World War II, we may see that they were driven by the need for additional, mostly

cheap labor from other countries. During that time, the issue of migration was not politicized for it was justified by economic reasons and views that the status of guest workers was temporary rather than permanent (Huysmans, 2000). It was not until the late 1960s and 1970s that migrations became a political issue after the changes in immigration policies and the introduction of more restrictive measures occurred (Huysmans, 2000). Restrictive measures were aimed at protecting economic and social rights of domicile workers. In the meantime, it became clear that the status of guest workers had a permanent character rather than a temporary one – bearing in mind the fact of family reunification, as well as the birth of the first generation of children of guest workers in Western Europe (Huysmans, 2000).

In the meantime, the anti-immigrant discourse in Europe has intensified. In the mid-1980s, the issue of immigration became important in the political agenda of the European Commission, which began to advocate the European immigration policy. As a consequence of the influx of migrants in 1990, the Dublin Convention was adopted, aimed at preventing the abuse of asylum seekers and establishing a database of persons whose asylum status requests were rejected. By signing a treaty on the European Union, i.e. The 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, which entered into force on January 1, 1993, furthermore acquires immigration policy in the context of the Third Pillar concerning cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs (Seilonen, 2016: 33). With this procedure the Maastricht Treaty constitutes the legal basis for the securitization of migration in the European Union.

Accordingly, the European Union aims to increase the cooperation between the Member States in the area of controlling the external borders of the Union and controlling migration and cooperation on a common asylum policy (Seilonen, 2016: 33). In the following period, the European Union was moving toward the establishment of a more effective (more restrictive) immigration policy system, adopting a set of documents and mechanisms that regulate migration and asylum issues (Seilonen, 2016: 33)<sup>17</sup>.

### **3. Securitization of migration in the European Union**

The securitization theory was created within the Copenhagen School of Security Studies (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998) and is “the most lenient attempt to develop a theory or framework for security studies in a constructivist tradition” (McDonald, 2012: 117). Securitization is defined as a process by which a securitizing factor determines a particular thing or factors as an existential threat to a particular reference object, and if such rhetoric is accepted by the relevant audience, conditions have been created for the use of special measures in response to the observed crisis (McDonald, 2012). Accordingly, the theory of securitization consists of a speech

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<sup>17</sup> Dublin Regulation II in 2003, Hague Programme, 2005, Treaty of Amsterdam, 2007, Stockholm Programme, 2009, Dublin III, 2014.

act that is, securitizing moves, securitizing actors, special measures and audiences. A successful securitization is followed by the narrative that it is an existential threat and a question of survival. The threat must be accepted by the audience as dangerous (Ejdus, 2012: 108).

After the presentation of migration movements in Europe it is necessary to explain the impact of migration on the security agenda in the European Union, that is, the problem of this process as significant, and existential for the preservation of security, the European culture, and political and economic stability. Also, in this context, it is crucial that the audience perceives the social construction of the threat. Successful process of securitization of migration requires the activities of special actors, the audience and the taking of special measures. In the literature on the securitization of migration, migrations are most often treated as a threat to national security, culture, economic and social stability (Beck, 2017; Huysmans, 2000). In this context, we will follow the securitization of migration into the European Union through the stated dimensions in three different discourses, that is, the three levels of social space. The first discourse is institutionalized and manifested through the policies of the European Union. The second is a populist discourse that is visible in the public appearances of some senior officials on the occasion of the migrant crisis. Finally, it is about xenophobic discourse in public and the expansion of hatred and violence against migrants.

### **European Union policy on the securitization of migration**

The securitization of migration may be explained in the context of the EU policies with the approach offered by Dace Schlenz (2010). Schlenz analyzes three levels of securitization of migration in the European Union. The first level refers to policies, decision-making and legislation. The second level refers to technological solutions, which are important for the border management (Schlenz, 2010: 16). The third level of analysis refers to the establishment of institutional, administrative and operational practices<sup>18</sup>. Schlenz compares the asylum and immigration policy in the European Union from 1992 to September 11, 2001, and from September 11, 2001 to 2008. Based on the analysis, he concludes that the process of securitization of migration has been on the rise following the terrorist attacks on the United States. The escalation of the migrant crisis has only deepened this situation toward intensified securitization (Schlenz, 2010: 16). Questioning the Schengen Agreement and the reintroduction of internal borders by individual member states in accordance with the provisions of the Schengen Code best support this claim. The migration crisis has shown a series of weaknesses and porosity of the European Union's external borders, calling the entire system into question (European Commission, 2016). The Schengen agreement represents an important achievement in the history of European integration, so the resulting

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<sup>18</sup> Such as the establishment of Frontex, the EU external borders agency in 2004, which became operational soon, which is unusual for the structures of the European Union (Schlenz, 2010: 28), which demonstrates the importance the European Union places on migration.

situation has called the proper functioning of the agreement into question. Since September 2015, a total of eight Schengen countries (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Austria, Slovenia, Sweden and Norway) have established border control at internal borders regarding the migrant crisis for the sake of internal security (European Commission, 2016: 9). Following the eruption of the migrant crisis, the European Union has made significant efforts to secure its external borders. The policy of migrant control in countries beyond the borders of the European Union, that is, to stop migrants' movement, is one of the important approaches to this problem.<sup>19</sup> Regarding operational practice, Frontex (2018: 31) argues that security checks at the external borders are the guiding mechanism of the Schengen area and the guarantee of the security of the Union and its citizens.

### **Public discourse and populism**

The views of politicians from the member states of the European Union differ significantly in terms of migration, which has led to sharp political divisions. Germany has accepted the largest number of migrants compared to other member states. Chancellor Angela Merkel said in her first address to the Bundestag following the formation of a new government that the migrant crisis had polarized German society. Angela Merkel's policy has been severely criticized by the opposition right-wing Alternative for Germany (AFD), whose president Alexander Gauland said that the policy toward migrants is wrong, that the "society is falling apart" and that Merkel's "migration policy" had also "polarized Europe", and many European Union members are rightfully opposed to the reception of migrants. In an article published in the Time magazine, the Austrian Prime Minister Sebastian Kurtz stated the following regarding the migration crisis (Kurtz, December 18, 2017): "Stopping and returning illegal migrants to their countries of origin must become standard procedure. In order to bolster our readmission policy, the EU should use all instruments at its disposal, including the fact that it is the most important donor of development assistance worldwide." Such attitudes confirm the thesis of the securitization of migrations regarding the crisis. The migrant crisis is a trigger event for the rise of populism in Europe. Unlike other "waves" of migration to Europe over the past decades, the current migrant crisis has led to cultural changes in Europe, because migrants are not Europeans and do not belong to European culture. According to Seilonen (2016: 1) „in the previous decades, the immigrants have more than ever consisted of "non-European, non-Christian and non-white people", as contrary to for example the earlier migration waves from Southern and Eastern Europe." Regarding the securitization of migration in the context of speech, it is important to list statements by politicians whose attitudes

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<sup>19</sup> In that sense, on March 7, 2016, the European Union signed an agreement with Turkey, according to which Turkey committed itself to cooperate on the prevention of migration and to accept all migrants migrating from Turkey to Greece who are not in need for international protection. Turkey has also committed itself to returning all illegal migrants who have been stopped in Turkish waters. The agreement also provides for cooperation on the improvement of anti-smuggling measures (Council of the EU, 2016).

have an impact on the public. For example, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán stated that Europe was in a grip of madness and argued that the influx of Muslim refugees posed a threat to European Christian identity (The Guardian, September 3, 2015), while in 2016, at a German right-wing parade AFD, in Schwerin, a former President of the Czech Republic Václav Klaus stated that mass migration would change Europe's face forever and that terrorism was an integral part of migration and a threat to freedom, (Raynolds, August 24, 2016). (Terrorism was a part of migration and a threat to freedom). Also, Marcus Pretzell, a chairman of the Alternative for German party (AFD), stated that the victims of the terrorist attack carried out by a migrant from Tunisia, Anis Amri, at the Christmas Fair in Berlin, on December 19, 2016, were "Merkel's Dead" (Beck, 2017). The migrant crisis has undoubtedly led to a sharp rhetoric toward migrants and a rise in populism in the EU countries.

### **Xenophobic discourse**

The securitization of migration also need to be considered as a product of an increase in xenophobia toward migrants, which is the inevitable consequence of populist discourse. In the time of social turmoil and tensions, the identity issue gains importance. A group that is considered vulnerable becomes homogenized, internal contradictions are resolved against external threats (Coser, 2007). The identity crisis leads to the emergence of extremist groups who, by hatred toward a culturally different group, confirm their own identity (Perry, 2001). They want to neutralize the threat posed by minority groups and see them as a cultural, political, economic, and demographic threat (Lalic, 2013). Such a tide of intolerance leads to intimidation and attacks on members of minority groups, in this case migrants, for they "invade" their environment and pose a threat to their cultural values and way of living (Levin & McDevitt, 1993). Xenophobic discourse is not solely the characteristic of marginal social groups or groups whose position is worsened as a result of post-industrial changes. Intolerance to cultural diversity, be it overt or covert, regardless of the leading currents of thought in the culture of Europe, which are dominantly inclusive and democratic, may be perceived in some intellectuals of the Western tradition, who left deep traces on social thought. Arguments supporting this claim may be found in Jirgene Habermas and Frensis Fukuyama (Lalić, Đurić & Lipovac, 2016: 56-57). Habermas's claim that this category of people, which he mistakenly calls underclass, can only be controlled by repressive means: "An underclass produces social tensions that discharge in aimless, self-destructive revolts and can only be controlled by repressive means" (Habermas [1996] 1998: 123, as cited in De Genova, 2010) is an obvious example of xenophobic discourse in the function of securitization of migrations. Frensis Fukuyama sees the issue of migration in Europe as one of the biggest threats to liberal democracy in Europe, which has already resulted in terrorism and violence (Fukuyama, 2006, as cited in De Genova, 2010). Such a claim only supports the securitization of migrations and the legitimacy of xenophobic discourse in Western culture. Intolerance toward people from other cultures in Europe is not a marginal phenomenon, but a phenomenon that may be traced in a

historical context in a European culture that has a long history of colonialism and racism (Moss, 2005). The migrant crisis has only intensified the trends toward xenophobia and hate-motivated violence in the European Union. The European Union Fundamental Rights Agency in the report notes the following (FRA, 2016: 1):

„Asylum seekers and migrants face various forms of violence and harassment across the European Union (EU). As this month’s report on the migration situation underscores, such acts are both perpetrated and condoned by state authorities, private individuals, as well as vigilante groups. They increasingly also target activists and politicians perceived as ‘pro-refugee’. “

Asylum seekers and migrants face various forms of violence and abuse throughout the European Union (EU).

### **Migrations, private security sector and outsourcing migration control**

The next level of analysis deals with the question of how the securitization of migration influences the private security sector, and if there is a chain of cause and effect between the securitization of migration and the expansion of the private security sector in the European Union.<sup>20</sup> In the previous elaboration, we have presented the situation regarding migration in the European Union and explained how this process is securitized and thus seen as an existential threat to European culture in the broadest context. Private security firms have “positioned themselves” in the process of securitization of migration as one of its actors. Now we consider the role of private security companies in the implementation of special measures, in other words, restrictive immigration policies, and what their role is in relation to the current state of security, or rather, the perception of the security of European Union citizens. Private security firms are gaining their sphere of activity by increasingly intensified social changes caused by neoliberal policies and conflicts in the crisis regions of the world. They become a significant institutional potential in the overall response capacity to a resulting crisis.

The reasons for contracting private security firms to manage migration control are complex. However, the two factors considered to be significant are the policies of neoliberalism on the one hand, and the “security pressure” that creates the current migrant crisis for the countries in Europe. These two factors are dealt with analytically in order to see their impact on the increase

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<sup>20</sup> What can be said is that more extensive research is needed to obtain empirical data on the number of migrant centers before and after the crisis, and to what extent they are guided by the public or private sector. In this way, it might be possible to see if there is any cause-effect relationship, that is, if there is a positive correlation. This is not possible without it. What is now possible is to analyze the secondary data to see what current trends exist.



in the engagement of private security firms and the outsourcing of jobs which traditionally fall within the competence of the state.

The first segment refers to the neoliberal policies that rest on the ideology of the superiority of private actors over public ones (Menz, 2011). Such an approach is based on the assumption that private entities can provide better quality services than the public sector. Neoliberalization in the context of outsourcing security services is a dynamic process that has a different impact on individual countries. The same applies to the involvement of private entities to manage the control of migration. To what extent private entities will be entrusted with these tasks depends on the degree of neoliberalization of a particular country. In this respect, the Anglo-Saxon countries such as the United States and Great Britain are predominant, but the process of involving the private security sector is also present in other countries that are not so largely neoliberalized as Germany, the Netherlands (Menz, 2011), or Austria. Entrusting these tasks does not mean abolishing state responsibilities, but rather finding new ways to control the migration process, which, among other things, includes the employment of the private security sector.

In relation to migration, the role of private security firms may predominantly be viewed in three segments: (1) the first segment relates to the “outsourcing” of private immigration and asylum centers managed by private security firms; (2) the second one to the expansion of their role in providing protection to citizens under the contract, and the third to other modalities of engaging private security firms regarding the challenges and threats posed by a migrant crisis. The main trends for each of these categories are listed in the following section.

### **1) Outsourcing immigration and asylum centers**

Some European countries have outsourced immigration detention centers and asylum centers, in line with neoliberalization trends, that is, with the degree of acceptance and implementation of neoliberal policies. Such a practice is present in Great Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria. The privatization of these institutions was not generally well accepted by the public, primarily because of ethical issues and frequent violations of the human rights of migrants and asylum seekers by personnel employed by private security firms. Some of the cases of human rights violations that received great media coverage are listed. In the United Kingdom, Jimmy Mubenga, an Angolan migrant, died after being escorted on a flight by the members of the private security firm G4S. Mubenga complained on an airplane about the inhumane treatment and serious breathing problems, after which he collapsed. The flight was canceled and Mubenga soon died in hospital. The G4S security guards were initially convicted of murdering the migrant, but were acquitted in the further proceedings, but the jury concluded that endemic racism was the factor that caused the death of the migrant.

The living conditions in the centers are inhumane. Research suggests that immigrants often suffer from mental disorders, post-traumatic stress and depression in the United Kingdom (Peirce, et al., 2008). In Germany, there were also cases of physical attacks and inhumane treatment

of asylum-seekers by security guards, after which the police conducted investigations. In some cases, security guards recorded videos of inhumane treatment of asylum seekers – it happened in the asylum centers in Barbach and Essen in October 2014. There are also recorded cases of sexual exploitation and referral of young migrants to prostitution by security personnel whose responsibility was to protect them (Deutsche Welle, October 25, 2017).

## **2) Expansion of the private security sector in roles and responsibilities in providing services of the protection of citizens under a contract**

The migrant crisis has led to an increase in demand for private security firms. There are no systematic data indicating the extent to which the demand for these services has increased after the outbreak of the crisis, but we may specify some trends. Terrorist attacks in Europe involving migrants have led to the expansion of private security firms due to the fear of terrorism. An example of such a suicide terrorist act took place in Ansbach, Bavaria, when a refugee from Syria activated an explosive device after he had prevented from entering the music festival in the city center. On that occasion, the attacker was killed and 15 people were wounded. The Ansbach attack was the fourth attack in that week. Prior to this, a seventeen-year-old asylum seeker from Afghanistan had wounded five people with a knife on a train near the city of Würzburg, then an eighteen-year-old German of Iranian origin killed nine people in Munich with a gun; a twenty-year-old asylum seeker from Syria killed a woman with a machete and wounded two people in the city of Reutlingen (The Guardian, July 25, 2016). Terrorism is a complex phenomenon and it should not be immediately associated to the migrant crisis. Also, it is wrong to conclude that all migrants pose a terrorist threat, but the facts say that individuals have participated in the commission of terrorist attacks. The fear of terrorism in the German public directly affected the increase in demand for private security firms. According to die Welt's report, security measures at public gatherings have increased significantly with the inevitable involvement of private security firms. There is an increase in demand for security services by ordinary citizens during the organization of private parties. The following segment where the demand for services exists relates to the security of refugee camps, which are often targeted by right-wing groups (The Local, August 1, 2016).

## **Other models of the employment of private security firms regarding the migration crisis**

Possible models of the employment of private security firms to manage migration control may include the collaboration between the private security companies and the police regarding migration control activities. Our analysis of documents and media reports indicated that such a model of collaboration was not widespread. We encountered such an example of collaboration in one case only. According to the Guardian, in 2015, the Slovenian police planned to hire 60 security

workers to assist the police to control the movement of a large number of migrants crossing the Slovenian border from Croatia (The Guardian, October 26, 2015).

Regarding the possible models of cooperation of private security companies, we refer to the proposal of the founder of the private company Blackwater, Erik Price (Kirchgaessner, November 30, 2017) to the European Union, to stop the influx of migrants on their route through Libya. Eric Princ proposed to form, train and equip private police that would be deployed along the southern Libyan border for a portion of the money that the European Union allocates for the migrant crisis. This would prevent the influx of migrants from this route before they reach the Mediterranean. The proposal was severely criticized by the United Nations and human rights organizations.

## **Conclusion**

In this paper, we examined the impact of migration, migration policies and the securitization of migration on the private security sector in the European Union. Migration to Europe from underdeveloped and politically unstable countries has been a continuing process since the end of the Second World War. Some European countries, if we look at the colonial period, were directed outwardly from the outside but at the same time maintained a restrictive immigration policy at home. Europe was closed to the population of other non-European cultures. In the meantime, not much has changed. Europe remains a desired destination for migrants, and restrictive immigration policies still represent an obstacle to achieve this goal. Such a situation has contributed to illegal migration. Over the past few decades, some European countries have accepted a number of migrants from war-affected areas, but most of them have come to Europe for economic reasons. The war in Sri Lanka and mass migration from other areas culminated in 2015 and created the biggest migrant crisis that the European Union has faced since its formation. The issue of migration in European political, economic, and cultural and security discourse is often seen as an existential threat to European culture as a whole. The securitization of migration in the European Union is an evident process that manifests itself at the institutional level, in the sphere of political activity and the public in general, where there is an increase in intolerance and xenophobia toward migrants. In the context of the securitization of migration, if we look at the theory of securitization and if the current situation is empirically tested, we may conclude that all elements of the securitization theory are evident on the ground. Specifically, migrations were seen as an existential threat, special measures were taken, a tide of intolerance and hatred toward migrants was created in the public discourse. The audience accepted the socially constructed thesis of the existential threat and thus the process of the securitization of migration was successfully completed. It should be noted that dominant processes are discussed here and that the European Union also has positive attitudes toward the reception of migrants. The securitization theory involves the introduction of special measures. In this context, we examined the role of private security firms in this process. Migration is reshaping the security landscape and has an impact on the private security industry. Neoliberal

policies and the massive influx of migrants have led to the privatization of migrant detention centers and asylum centers in individual countries in the European Union. Fear of terrorism and the association of migration to terrorism directly affected high demand for services offered by the private security sector. It is troubling that in many cases employees of the private firms were involved in scandals and cases of serious violations of the human rights of the migrants. The employment of private security firms is not well accepted by the public regarding the privatization of migrant detention centers and asylum centers. The private security firms are like to play a more important role in the context of migration control in the future. However, the issue of the control over the private security firms and their responsibilities remains, without which the professional integrity and the justification of employing private security firms is called into question.

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