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RETHINKING MILITARY DIPLOMACY IN ACHIVING STRATEGIC ENDS  
ПРЕИСПИТУВАЊЕ НА ВОЕНАТА ДИПЛОМАТИЈА ЗА ОСТВАРУВАЊЕ  
НА СТРАТЕШКИ ЦЕЛИ

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ABSTRACT

Security dynamics in international relations have dramatically changed after the Cold War. Processes of globalization and technological development along with all benefits have brought many challenges too. Although victorious, Western power were soon confronted with new challenges steaming from numerous internal and regional crisis. Parallel to this, employing benefits from globalization and technological development many non-state actors like never before have gained strategic power and thus have started to influence international relations including security. To address existing challenges Western powers have introduced a range of new missions for military forces. These new missions, from peace-keeping and peace-building through humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to the regime change and democratization under the auspices of the war on terror have unequivocally imposed necessity for change in military culture. Concepts such as "network centered warfare", "rapid, decisive operations" or "shock and awe" remain as valuable as ever. However, from military engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq we learned that operational environments have radically changed. As a result contemporary operations on tactical level hold potential to have strategic impacts. Planners and operators in the future should considered complex operational environment which is in constant change and under the influence by many actors, including potential adversaries who have unique capabilities to adopt. Therefore success could be guarantee to those who tailor and execute future operations in accordance to other instruments of political power (diplomacy, economics and information).

This article argues that to be able to effectively transfer political guidance in to tasks and effective missions on terrain, midlevel and junior officers along with noncommissioned officers, among others, during pos-conflict operations must demonstrate diplomatic skills,

as an essential tool for successful mission accomplishment. These skills should be considered not just in immediate pre-deployment training and preparations, but in development of troupe leading procedures and eventually in the overall military education.

Key words: Military diplomacy, counterinsurgency, operational planning, cultural understanding, strategic ends, tactical operations, international law of armed conflict, international human rights law

### АПСТРАКТ

Динамиките по кои се одвиваат безбедноста и меѓународните односи значително се сменија во периодот по крајот на Студената Војна. Процесот на глобализацијата и технолошкиот развој покрај бенефициите донесоа и многу предизвици. Победниците од Студената Војна, Западните сили, набргу се соочија со нови предизвици кои произлегоа од низа внатрешни и регионални кризи. Паралелно на ова, користејќи ги предностите на глобализацијата и технолошкиот развој голем број на не-државни актери како никогаш до тогаш, се стекнаа со стратешка моќ и на тој начин започнаа да влијаат врз меѓународните односи вклучувајќи ја и безбедноста. Со цел да реагираат соодветно Западните сили воведоа низа нови мисии за воените сили. Овие мисии, кои се протегаа од чување на мир и градење на мир преку хуманитарна помош и намалување на ризикот од катастрофи, па се до смена на режими и демократизација согласно т.н. „Војна против тероризмот“, недвосмислено ја наметнаа потребата од проемна на воената култура. Во оваа насока концептите на употребата на воените сили како „мрежно ориентирано војување“, „брзи и одлучувачки операции“ или „шок и застрашување“, остануваат да бидат релевантни и понатаму. Тоа што е ново, а го научивме од употребата на воените сили во Авганистан и Ирак е дека оперативната средина е значително променета. Како резултат на ваквите промени за време на изведувањето на современите операции тактичките дејствувања имаат стратешки ефекти. За таа цел планерите и оперативците на теренот мора да ја земат во предвид комплексната оперативна средина која постојано се менува и е под влијание на низа актери меѓу кои се и потенцијалните непријатели кои имаат уникатната способност за брзо прилагодување. Затоа, успехот во современите операции им е загарантиран на оние кои при дизајнирањето и изведувањето на современите операции ќе знаат да ги искористат и останатите инструменти на национална-политичка моќ (дипломатијата, економијата и информациите).

Главната теза на овој труд е дека доколку младите и офицерите од средно ниво сакаат со успех да ги трансферираат политичките насоки во задачи на теренот, покрај останатото, за време на пост-конфликтните операции мора да демонстрираат дипломатски вештини, како основна алатка во исплонувањето на мисиите. Овие вештини мора да се земат во предвид не само за време на подготовката и обуката за распоредување, туку и во креирањето на процедурите за трупно водење и целокупната воена едукација.

Клучни зборови: Воена дипломатија, противбунтовништво, оперативно планирање, културни разлики, стратешки цели, тактички операции, меѓународно право за вооружен конфликт, меѓународно право за правата на човекот

## INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War has marked a new era in international relations, security and politics. Technological development along with the changes of political arena has stimulated globalization significantly. As a result the emergence of the new non-state actors and capable to pose asymmetric threats has significantly influenced military culture and ability to address new challenges during post-conflict operations. In this context military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq have clearly showed that in an age of globalization and technological development, warriors should consider different variables for success. To accomplish military objectives military leaders at all levels must consider other instruments of political power such as diplomacy, economics and information.

Hence to be able to effectively transfer political guidance in to tasks and effective missions on terrain, midlevel and junior officers along with noncommissioned officers, among others, must demonstrate diplomatic skills, as an essential tool for successful mission accomplishment. These skills should be considered not just in immediate pre-deployment training and preparations, but in development of troupe leading procedures, improvement of small unit tactics and eventually in the overall military education.

## COPING WITH THE EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION

Many saw the end of the Cold War along with the effects that came along as a promising change leading toward the global peace. Even though it is arguable whether or not these changes bring benefits it is clear that the effects i.e. globalization and technological development after the Cold War have seriously influenced international relations and politics. Conse-

quently these changes have introduced new dynamics in the context of international security. Some have focused on a narrow influence to security claiming that "...economic security... is displacing the military security through economic conflict which ultimately influence political interest...". (Gilpin, 2000) Others have saw range of changes that have impact on security. Seyom Brown for example discusses that there is re-conceptualization of security, and accordingly the change that is happening in two dimensions. First dimension as he explains are broadening changes, i.e., consideration of nonmilitary security threats such as environmental scarcity and degradation, spread of disease, overpopulation, refugee movements and terrorism. Second dimension is happening in deepening direction, i.e., consideration of the security of individuals and groups rather than focusing narrowly on external threats to states such as ethnic conflict, civil war, environmental threats and survival of individuals. (Brown, 1994: 1-17) Thus today it is clear that threats from conventional state to state conflicts are largely reduced. Nevertheless numerous internal and regional crises have seriously challenged world peace and security in a unique way.

Thanks to globalization and technological development many non-state actors (groups and individuals) like never before have gained strategic power by giving new meaning of information, economics, diplomacy and military as instruments of political power. Using the commercial advances of technology these actors have learned how to manipulate the power of information. (Cronin, 2006: 77) Arguably they have also employed some of the Cold War methods to gain global support for their destructive agenda.(Warren, 1992) Along with the use of force and information these actors have soon learned how to operate with economics as political instrument of power and effectively use it against its adversaries. Thus, purposefully or not they have affected global economy too. To neutralize these actors Western powers have unleashed all diplomatic instruments ranging from preventive diplomacy through coercive diplomacy including nation building projects. Nonetheless, although challenges were new the approach was conventional.

Diplomatic success designed to maintain world peace and security required employment of military as an instrument of political power. Hence military leaders and planers have soon faced new political guidance, such as ...to enforce the peace, create the peace, keep the peace, shape the peace, or to preserve and impose specific ideology. (Karste and Schabacker , 1998: 312-412) Bottom line is that this meant new missions for military forces. From peace-keeping and peace-building through humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to the regime change and democratization under the auspices of the war on terror, new missions have

unequivocally imposed necessity for change in military culture.

Military deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq represent clear examples of the above mentioned theses. Contemporary post-conflict operational environment is full of asymmetric threats posed by non-state actors. Today it is clear that non-state actors and their ambitions challenged military wisdom with the new type of conflict. As David Kilcullen puts it ...[I]t is a complex, problematic form of conflict that straddles the boundaries between warfare, government, social stability and moral acceptability... (Kilcullen, 2010: 193) Moreover complex operational environment in Afghanistan and Iraq confirmed that successful military campaign could no longer be measured with conventionally designed "cold war era" measurement of success.<sup>1</sup> For success military forces must coordinate with others instruments of power (i.e. diplomacy, economics and information). This nevertheless, requires range of new skills from the military forces.

#### UNDERSTANDING COTEMPORARY POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The post Cold War military engagement confirm the necessity for rapid changes in military culture. Although conventional warfare remains as important as ever, modern warriors must be capable of implementing different skills in different environment. The three block warfare concept in this context promoted by Marine General Krulak remain relevant as never before. As he putted (and this is relevant for the post-conflict operations) military should be capable to "fight and winning", to "stabilize and gained trust" and to "build and enable local authorities". (Krulak, 1997). Given the dynamics that gravitate in the age of globalization and technological one could easily conclude that for the overall success new skills are needed. New skills must be developed top-down, from strategic to tactical level among planners and operators.

Post-conflict projects as a new military business requires that military wisdom consider new variables that were on the margins in conventioanl Cold War operational matrix. Social stability and moral acceptability are variables that must drive military operators on the ground to meet political end-states. This however is not easy to achieve. Complex post-conflict environment is a place where different actors struggle for different goals. Each one of them seeks to maximize its own survivability, existence and improve its position in the dynamic ecosystem. (Kilcullen, 2010: 195) Tactical mistakes could easily cause strategic impacts. Accordingly to meet political end-states successfully, operators on the ground should be able

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1 Name Minerva is inspiration from Roman mythology and in this context is used to represent wisdom, tolerance defense and diplomacy. More about this see in: Larousse Desk Reference Encyclopedia, The Book People, Haydock, 1995, p. 215

to orchestrate political guidance, different civil-actors' requirements, military capacities and the overall populace will. This is why junior and midlevel officers, among others, must consider diplomatic skills. Nonetheless it must be clear that here we are not talking about conference type diplomacy, defense state-to-state diplomacy (Gerald, 2012) or about military attachés' role. (Gina, 2010) We are talking here about the ability of the operators on the ground to recognize how political guidance in the operational environment differ from different civil-actors' (neutral or even hostile) requirements. Furthermore how and to what level military capacities could be used in not destroying the system (the goal of the post-conflict operation for example) but, to put it in an politically acceptable mode of operation. Consequently this implies that to a certain degree military capacities are dedicated to the overall populace will.

This is why junior and midlevel officers, among others, must consider diplomatic skills. Precisely they need to be capable of demonstrating skills such as: to negotiate with tribal leaders; organize and conduct small and immediate projects; to reconcile disputes among different stakeholders; restrain when under the military logic should act; organize local election; develop know-how, enhance system's economics continuity etc.

Clear example for such requirements represent engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq during the post-conflict operations. Although initially there were some mistakes and miscalculations coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and NATO forces in Afghanistan soon have adopted. (McMaster, 2013) During stabilization phase, if not earlier, for example they have introduced the so-called Provincial Reconstruction Teams-PRT teams. (Bebber, 2008) The PRT's role was to introduce post-conflict, reconstruction, security, and development activities in areas still too hostile for non-governmental organizations and United Nations relief agencies. In other words, their role was to manage different projects designed to create enduring stability through security, host nations' stakeholders (private and public) capacities and sustainable market that will open jobs and inhibit recruitment mass for insurgents and spoilers.

Regardless of different opinions about their effectiveness it is clear that these teams have mobilized much of the supporting countries (troupe contributing countries) corporations and have opened the door for significant number of labor that is engaged in the overall post-conflict efforts. (GAO, 2008) Nonetheless what is significant is that military forces are faced with new necessities that require military leaders at all level to operate under comprehensive "telescope" not just narrow military one.

Some countries have clearly recognized modern operational requirements for success. New organizations such as the US State Department's Office for Reconstruction and

Stabilization (S/CRS), Canada's Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START), and the U.K.'s Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) attempt to address the unique bureaucratic needs of planning for and operating in post-conflict environments. (Skinner, 2013) These agencies' main goals are to coordinate business-friendly regime in place through PRT (predominantly led by military) and different private corporation's efforts in order to foster building capacities projects. These projects orchestrated through military operational designs (JP-05, 2011) for post-conflict nation building should ensure logistical infrastructure of transportation, communications and energy transmission networks, develop know-how capacities etc. In other words in Afghanistan for example they need to set up the country for business. NATO in these terms has pledged commitment to stay in Afghanistan until 2024. The US forces will stay to guard the US-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership and Canada is still negotiating its own strategic partnership with Afghanistan. (Gindin and Panitch, 2013) However to be honest not that just this is not enough, but all of the coalition forces have not even considered civil-military relations at this level yet. Giving that future military engagement will barely be unilateral and that success could not be achieved if only part of the coalition forces meet the operational requirements we will focus on some proposals that should be considered for future military engagement.

### INTRODUCING "MINERVA"<sup>2</sup> (DIPLOMACY) TO "MARS"

During the conference dedicated to War and Military Operations in the 21st Century, General James Mattis, underlined the need to match military means to political ends. The General as many other distinguished pundits called for a vastly improved decision-making process. Among other, during the conference (as many experts and academicians in other occasions have also argued), one thing that was clearly recognized was the need for the so-called "strategic awakening". In this light we argue that in today's hybrid conflicts, where there is a blurring of distinctions between conventional and irregular challenges, and between political and military issues, adaptation to the new circumstances will be key for operational success.

One direction where this adaption must be oriented is toward introducing diplomacy to tactical leaders on the ground. As we mentioned above current operational environment is unpredictable and fulfilled with actors that have different agendas. Considering that all

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2 Term "Mars" is used in metaphorical context to represent the ancient Roman's God of War. See more about this in: Beard Mary, North J.A., and Price, S.R.F., *Religions of Rome: A History*, (Cambridge University Press, 1998): 47-48

of these actors play specific role that affects overall operational success modern military engagement requires one to consider centralized planning and decentralized execution. However to successfully implementation of this concept requires credential human resources.

Among others, future education of operational and tactical leaders must consider development of diplomatic skills. These skills should enable midlevel and junior officers along with noncommissioned officers, to effectively transfer political guidance in to tasks on terrain. Although some armed forces have recognized this, so far development of these skills are usually considered in immediate pre-deployment training and preparations. (Green, 2007) Nevertheless although the overall idea is that civilian experts should be deployed along with the military and therefore they would be the one who will lead these efforts, so far, it became clear that deploying civilians along the military is not always possible.

On the other hand as the lessons learned from many conflict and post-conflict situations indicate, a viable, effective government has all but vanished. In some cases, it may have never existed at all. At the tactical and operational levels, a trained civilian employee can approximate many of the functions of a local or central governance. More or less so far such understanding was a driving force in US and some other Western coalition special forces' pre-deployment training. Nevertheless as Dan Green argues even though US Special Forces recognize that good governance, coupled with informed and targeted reconstruction and development projects, is integral to a successful post-conflict effort, they generally do not have experts who can implement durable programs. This is understandable since training and skills are driven by different requirements.

David Galula recognized when there is a shortage of civilian political and administrative personnel, "making a thorough census, enforcing new regulations on movements of persons and goods, informing the population, conducting person-to-person propaganda, gathering intelligence on the insurgent's political agents, implementing the various economic and social reforms, etc.-all these will become their primary activity. . . Thus, a mimeograph machine may turn out to be more useful than a machine gun, a soldier trained as a pediatrician more important than a mortar expert, cement more wanted than barbed wire, clerks more in demand than riflemen." (Galula, 2006: 66)

If we have sufficient civilian personnel-experts in political and administrative matters-to perform such tasks, soldiers would be free to perform essential military functions. The problem with this however is that in practice this is not the case even for the most advanced armed forces in this context such as US, Canadian or UK.



Development of the diplomatic skills among the tactical leaders in the future post-conflict engagements should focus on several areas. These areas include (but are not limited to) providing for political leadership; building and enhance local institutions, support and improvement of governance, produce adequate information for the strategic leadership in accordance to the cultural and historical context.

#### THE IMPORTANCE OF DIPLOMATIC SKILLS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE FOR POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

Macedonian engagement in Afghanistan (MOD of the Republic of Macedonia, 2012) and Iraq, (Hadji-Janev, 2007:178) as well as other South-Eastern European experience, confirms what many have already understood, that tactical engagements during modern post-conflict operations could have strategic impact. Current dynamics in the post-conflict operational environments dictate that leaders on the ground need to be able to make quick decisions. Usually if these decisions are not timely managed might produce different outcome if they are undertaken with late response. Decisions that usually follow political chain of command are slow and not designed to address post-conflict dynamics and developments. In many cases political representatives either do not fill safe or are hard to be reached due to the infrastructure or operational security issues. Here one should be cautious and not misunderstand our thesis, i.e. civilian role in these cases remain as valuable as ever, but in many situation it is almost impossible to have it.

#### DIPLOMATIC SKILLS FOR ENHANCEMENT OF LOCAL INSTITUTIONS

Effective support and enhancement of the local institutions is also valuable line of operations during the overall post-conflict operational design. To successfully accomplish objectives that are usually designed and attained to this line of operations some forces have developed ranges of pre-deployment training. Extensive cultural, regional and language training should tailor future tactical operators' profile in a way that they could interacting with citizens of other countries and still keep strategic guidance and objectives in a loop. Nevertheless, recent efforts in this context are just scratching the surface because the final goal is to eliminate spoilers and insurgents directly, i.e. through direct actions missions. What is needed are capabilities not designed toward destruction of the system but capabilities designed to put the system in to a stable mode of operations through objectives that will enable indirect isolation of negative actors. Recent experience confirm that one could achieve this through political objectives such as developing governance improving public administration

and facilitate successful parliamentary and provincial elections. This however would not be achieved without strategic thinking and tactical action. Putted in other words tactical leaders at the lowest level should be qualified to employ standard operational procedures under the wider political objectives' default. Developing these skills has direct and indirect benefits.

Directly it will not stimulate grievances against the military and eventually inhibit legitimacy. Connected to this indirectly it will not hurt the operational moral. For example, during his command of ISAF forces in Afghanistan as many argued he issued the strictest directives to avoid civilian casualties. Driven by his visions i.e. the so called "insurgent math"-as he called it for "every innocent person you kill, you create 10 new enemies", he urged military forces to hold when they needed to act or were trained to do so). Without really getting his visions and intent and the fog that was created by the media and subordinates who could not get his point, the outcome was bad morale and inhibited will to operate.

#### DIPLOMATIC SKILLS FOR IMPROVING GOVERNANCE

Achieving effective governance is more or less the end-state in all contemporary post-conflict efforts. Leaders on the ground must demonstrate skills that will provide for the overall mission accomplishment and this could not be possible if there is no effective local and central host governance. These skills are especially important means in the most sensitive phase (usually last phase-known as enabling civil authorities) while achieving strategic ends. Demonstrating diplomatic skills should enable tactical leaders to have better understanding of tribal disputes, personal animosities, and local government functions. Indirectly while achieving former decisive points commanders will increase situational awareness, will avoid being dragged into tribal or personal disputes, will increase ability to identify insurgents in the general population, will be able to learn specifics about some local relations and ultimately to gain credible partner in insurgents' isolation. Consequently, such set of information when passed to the operational level could enable producing qualitative political overview of the specific province that may or may not differ from the general knowledge. Practically this could help in complex situations and keep forces away from factional disputes or in situation where qualitative assessment are needed. For example, whether the specific persons are broadly supported by the community and what capacity they might have at good governance.

Although these and similar suggestions are not brand new for the western hemisphere, they offer fresh approaches that should be considered. Nevertheless, we are proposing steps further that will improve identified anomalies or will at least stimulate further

qualitative professional and academic debates. Even more, most of the coalition forces from the region of South East Europe (SEE) have not even consider civilian efforts such as their allies. In this context we strongly believe that discussions and debates in this direction are not just valuable for SEE region but for the overall future coalition efforts and engagements in the post-conflict operations.

### CONCLUSION

Globalization and technological developments have posed new rules for employing military as instrument of political power. To be successful military must consider coordination with other instruments of political power such as diplomacy, information and economics. Military success does not end with military victory but with creating sustainable and enduring peace. To achieve this warriors must be able to practice diplomatic skills if they are about to accomplish successful post-conflict projects. Unequivocally for this achievement credible civil components capable of implementing required strategies along with military are needed. However recent practice has shown that first, acquiring qualitative civilian components is not always possible; and second, that most of the coalition forces have not employed such forces or have not seriously considered such efforts.

Equipped with diplomatic skills among other skills, military midlevel and junior officers and noncommissioned officers could give great contribution in achieve strategic end-states. Skills designed to provide for host political elites, enhance local institutions and local and central governance must be implemented not just in pre-deployment training but also in the overall military education.

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