ON WAR

Abstract

Security studies cannot escape the war and the process of warfare. The debates about the changed nature of war are as old as the very notion of war. The author asks the following questions: Is Clausewitz still relevant to the evolving concept of the battlefield?; What is the contribution of narratives on political violence and terrorism in the process of military mobilization?!; Can we and how can we study modern warfare through the lens of culture?! and Does war still exist in the eyes of international law?! In the analysis of war when the primary trinity (of Clausewitz) is used as an analytical framework, it becomes apparent that Clausewitz’s theory of war is broad and fluid enough to cover the entire military spectrum, including irregular non-state conflicts. The concept of narrative can contribute to the theory and research of the phenomena of terrorism, political violence, and radicalization. Exploration of the current significance of the concept of war includes issues essential to the prohibition on the threat of use of force or the use of force in Article 2 (4) of the Charter, in times of heightened will to use force as a foreign policy instrument. Questions about total war, the link between war and globalization, and the changes in warfare in the advanced industrial democracies of the West remain unanswered.

Keywords: WAR, WAR, PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, CLAUSEWITZ.

Introduction

Warfare can be viewed in many ways. War is a phenomenon that causes a lot of suffering, but on the other hand, the same war accelerates technological inventions and has always been a catalyst for social and political reforms. Although considered evil, it is sometimes necessary, given the perspective of what the UN calls the imposition of “international peace and security”. The need to study war in some cases is driven by bias to help one’s own side win the war, and in other cases, the approach to it is like the medical approach to diseases according to which they need to be studied in order to be able to cure it. Regardless of the motivation for studying it, the basis of the study is the concern of war. In particular, trends in the impact on civilians and the possibility of using weapons of mass destruction are a reminder that warfare remains an important source of insecurity in the world.
The arising issue is reconsidering the notion of war and some of the main features of the armed conflict after the end of World War II. Today there is a general feeling that the threat of a major war between the great powers has diminished since the Cold War, but still, in some parts of the world there is still war and one of the reasons for rethinking the war is to try to overcome its legacies of the past. Although the number and intensity of wars have declined recently, much money is still being spent on developing armed systems in order to win a future war. In 2005, for example, the US government spent about $ 8 billion a month on the war in Iraq alone (ICG 2006, 32), and according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, in 2005 the total world consumption reached $ 1,188 billion. Especially in underdeveloped countries, war remains the main source of insecurity. A re-examination of the phenomenon of war can be done first by analyzing the three main philosophies of war and explaining the approach to the notion of war in modern security studies, i.e., examining the ways of understanding the role of war in world politics.

1. Philosophies of war

Most thinkers of society have not been able to grasp the enormous problem that war poses to our understanding of the society in general: they marginalize it, treat it as exceptional, abnormal, and so on. From the Enlightenment to Durkheim, most great sociologists omit war from their central themes. As a result, work in the sociology of war lacks an integrated focus. However, the lack of a coherent, integrative framework did not stop scientific work on war. A new interest in war generated a corpus of written papers often poured together under the title “Sociology of War and the Military” which is very diverse (Kurtz, 1992). It ranges from macro-historical arguments about the importance of war as a factor in social change (Marwick 1974; Smith, H. 1986) to studies of the impact of war on the civilian population. Historian-sociologists have studied the impact of war on the revolution (Adelman 1985), state-building (Mann 1986), industrial conflict, and democracy (Downing 1992), among others. All of these, and more, are reference objects in the sociology of war.

The famous Prussian military theorist and philosopher of war, Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), in his masterpiece On War, gives a basic definition of war and logically analyzes how an act such as warfare can substantially affect the nature of social events. Clausewitz is not convinced that military campaigns from different historical epochs can be studied as “lessons” for the present. On the contrary, Clausewitz (1976, 586-93) recognizes the changing interactions of society and the military that lead to completely different ways of waging war. Clausewitz announces his intention to audit On War on the basis of two guiding ideas: first, that there are two types of war: comprehensive warfare and limited warfare; and second, that war is a continuation of politics by other means. He transformed it but did not abandon the old military look and resorted to completely new theoretical views (Gat, 1989, 199). Clausewitz believed that he
had overcome this contradiction, between defining war in terms of unbridled violence and defining war as a continuation of politics by introducing the concept of absolute war. Furthermore, this basic framework can be developed and modified in accordance with the view that the social organization of the actors has a decisive role in the predictions of military stakes.

Continuing with this and commenting on the impact of war on politics and society at large, Anatoly Rapoport (1968, 12-13) points out that we need to explore the ways in which the acceptance or rejection of a particular philosophy of war can influence the role of war on everyday human affairs and so deeply affect our lives. Thus, Rapoport classifies three types of philosophies about war: political, eschatological, and cataclysmic.

The political philosophy of war

Clausewitz advocated the political philosophy of war, with the well-known definition of war as an act of violence aimed at forcing the adversary to do our will, or as “war - an extended arm of politics”. “War is an act of force to make our enemy do our will. . . and there is no logical limit to the use of that force” (1976: 75-7). “Combat forces must be destroyed: i.e. they must be brought to such a state that they can no longer fight . . . the land must be occupied... However, both things can be done and war. . . it cannot be considered over until the will of the enemy is broken ... (1976: 90) “. Summed up: of all the possible goals in war, the destruction of the forces of the armed enemies always appears as the highest (1976: 99). In his later revisions of the text, Clausewitz gives a second, radically different, answer, a highly cited notion that war is a continuation of politics by other means: War is nothing but a continuation of politics by other means (1976: 60). War is not only an act of politics but also a real political instrument, a continuation of a political relationship, conducted by other means ... The political goal is the intention, war is only a means to an end, and the means can never be considered isolated from their purpose. While the idea that war is a continuation of politics was a guiding factor in his mature analysis of the nature of war, Clausewitz also writes that warfare was a complex combination of passion, chance, and reason. The first of these three elements mainly concerns people; the second to the commander and his army; the third to government, where political goals are the business of government alone. To the extent that the war was a continuation of politics, it was a rational, deliberate activity aimed at changing the behavior of the adversary.

According to this philosophy, war is a rational instrument of achieving a national goal, i.e. war is rational, instrumental, and national. The decision for war is made on the basis of a reasonable assessment of the national political authorities in accordance with the visionary goal. In Clausewitz’s time, political authorities were represented through sovereign states, and the war was seen as a legitimate means of state policy to be used only for a clear purpose. When Clausewitz says that war is a continuation of politics, he should be interpreted as saying that war is a continuation of foreign policy in elite-dominated political
systems. With the advent of mass democracy, the meaning of the dictum that war is a continuation of politics has undergone significant change. It was no longer the simple rational pursuit of state skills by elites and became a more complex and dialectical process. Victory in practice with such a rational political instrument was won by those who were most skilled in the art of maneuvering and destroying.

*Eschatological philosophy of war*

Eschatological philosophy revolves around “the idea that history, or part of it, will culminate in a final war, which will lead to the realization of a vast plan - divine, natural or human” (Rapoport 1968: 15). The eschatological school of thought believes that all wars (or all major wars) lead to some goal and argues that a final conflict will someday resolve the path followed by all wars and result in a massive reversal of society and the subsequent creation of a new war-free society (in different theories, the resulting society can be either utopia or dystopia). This philosophy occurs in two variants: messianic and global.

In the messianic variant, it is assumed that the actor who is destined to carry out the grand plan already exists (came). His mission is to impose justice peace in the world, eliminating war in the future. The Messianic eschatological philosophy is derived from the Judeo-Christian concept of the Messiah and believes that wars culminate in the unification of mankind under a single faith or a single ruler.1

The global variant assumes that the grand plan will be realized in the chaos of the final war. In Christian eschatology, it is the Christian concept of Armageddon that implies forces that have gathered around Christ in his Second Coming and the final defeat of Satan (but may also fall under Messianic theory). The Marxist concept of the communist world, ruled by the proletariat after the last world revolution, is an example of the global theory. In communist eschatology, the struggle for power is between classes and not between states or religions. The emergence of the world proletariat was to transform the imperialist war into a class war and, after the defeat of the bourgeoisie, to establish a world order in which there would be no more wars.

*Cataclysmic philosophy of war*

Cataclysmic philosophy considers war to be “a catastrophe that will affect the whole human race or a part of it” (Rapoport 1968, 16). Thus, war is God’s punishment or the unfortunate effect of an anarchic international system. This philosophy also occurs in two variants: ethnocentric and global.

The first subcategory of the cataclysmic philosophy of thought is the ethnocentric cataclysm, in which this view focuses specifically on the sufferings of a particular ethnicity or nation. In the ethnocentric version, war is something that is likely to happen to us, that is, war is something that others threaten to do

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1 Examples of this philosophy include the Crusaders’ attempts to unite the world into one faith in the Middle Ages, the Nazi doctrine of super-race or al Qaeda and ISIS’ vision of a global caliphate, and the 19th-century American concept of the Fate Manifesto.
to us. The probable, impending war is not in our favor, and the only thing we can do is prevent the massive destruction or mitigate the worst consequences.2

In the global version, war is a cataclysm that will affect all of humanity, not just a certain group of people. Here, no one is responsible but no one benefits from that catastrophe. According to this philosophy, the focus is on preventing war, “discovering the causes of war, and discovering the instrumental methods of resolving conflicts” (Rapoport 1968: 40). The Cataclysmic school of thought, supported by Leo Tolstoy in his epic novel War and Peace, sees war as a prohibition for humanity - whether it is inevitable or inevitable - and serves nothing but to cause destruction and suffering and can cause drastic changes in society, but not in any teleological sense. Tolstoy’s position can be placed in the subcategory global cataclysmic philosophy of war.

Just as Tenah (in some parts) sees war as an inevitable act of God, so Tolstoy especially emphasizes war as something that happens to humanity and is in no way influenced by man’s “free will”, but is the result of an irresistible global force.

Interpreted according to these descriptions, in political philosophy war is compared to a strategic game (like chess), in the eschatological sense to the mission or outcome of the drama, and in the cataclysmic sense to a natural fire or epidemic.3

Challenging Clausewitz’s philosophy ?!

Historically, from the Napoleonic era until the First World War, European politics provided wonderful conditions for the flourishing and dominance of Clausewitz’s political philosophy. By the time the great European powers were stuck in the trenches of World War I, it became clear that the development of military technology confirmed the realization that Clausewitz’s methods were very expensive and the art of maneuvering almost impossible. The industrialized carnage of the Great War ceased to serve the political purposes of both sides. That is why eschatological and cataclysmic philosophy gained importance. Today, Clausewitz’s political philosophy is facing a major challenge. The debate has intensified over the extent to which Clausewitz’s views are still relevant. In challenging the relevance of Clausewitz’s political philosophy, we emphasize the following views:

2 For example, in Judaism the view of war as a punishment from God against the Israelites in certain writings of Tenah (The Old Testament).
3 These views, of course, do not exhaust the views on the war that reigns in different periods and in different places. For example, war was sometimes seen as a pastime or adventure, as the only proper occupation for a nobleman, as an affair of honor (for example, the days of chivalry), as a ceremony (eg among the Aztecs), as an outburst of aggressive instincts or manifestations of “mortal desire”, as a way of nature to ensure the survival of the fittest, as an absurdity (e.g. in the Eskimos), as a tough custom destined to die out as slavery and as a crime.
A) According to Martin Van Creveld: “Contemporary strategic thought ... is wrong and grounded in Clausewitz’s image, which is either unnecessary or wrong. We are entering an era ... of war between ethnic and religious groups ... In the future, the war will not be fought by armies, but by groups, we call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits, thieves, but who will strive for much higher positions to describe themselves. Their organizations will be created on a charismatic rather than an institutional line, loyalty on an ideological basis ... If low-intensity conflict is really a wave for the future, then strategy in the classical sense will disappear” (Van Creveld 1991, 197, 207).

B) In 1996, Delbert Thiessen commented that “the Gulf War is perhaps the last Clausewitz war to be waged” (Shimko 2010, 22). Thiessen is not the only professor to have predicted a war in which Clausewitz’s dictum is of little importance. Some of the most prominent writers in strategic and security studies have published analyzes of the nature of modern warfare that take as their starting point the declining importance of Clausewitz theory (Handel 2008; Schuurman 2010; Williams 2013; Strachan 2014; Lonsdale 2016). Martin van Creveld (1991), for example, sees the trend in global warfare against disorder and asymmetry as a sign of the obsolescence of Clausewitz’s theory, arguing that “[i]f low-intensity conflict is a wave of the future, then strategy in its classical sense it will disappear” (p. 207). In the same vein, Mary Caldor denies Clausewitz, claiming that states lost their primacy in war and were instead replaced by groups that identify themselves on the basis of religion or ethnicity (Caldor 2007; Schuurman 2010). Such a critique, however, is based on a fundamentally misreading of Clausewitz’s theory of war and the philosophical framework in which it is set.

In general, several events have openly undermined the strength of the political philosophy of war.

First, the concept of a battlefield, crucial to Clausewitz’s understanding, has disappeared. A battlefield, battleground, or field of battle is the location of a current or historical battle involving military warfare. It is generally understood to be limited to the point of contact between opposing forces, although battles may involve troops covering vast geographical areas. Modern military theory and doctrine, with the technological advancement in warfare, have evolved the understanding of the battlefield from that defined by the terrain to the multifaceted perception of all the factors that affect the conduct of battle and are conceived as a battlefield.

Historically, the military has sometimes trained using methods suitable for a flat battleground, but not for the terrain where they likely ended up fighting. No matter how much technology has changed, the terrain can still not be ignored, as it not only affects the movement of the battlefield, but also the movement to and from it, and the logistics are critical. The battlefield, in industrial times, can be a railway line or a highway. As technology becomes more sophisticated, the length of the “tail” on which the troops on the front depend becomes longer, and so does the number of places for which a battle can be resolved (outside the immediate point of contact).
The attacks of September 11, 2001, showed that today western cities can be areas of attack, and vice versa, the US war on terror - renamed the Long War - understands the battlefield as the whole planet. In the future, battles are unlikely to be limited to the planet Earth, and the United States in particular (besides Russia, China, etc.) will be forced to arm space to protect the satellites on which communication and information systems depend (Hirst, 2002). Increased urbanization and the need for cover-up of anti-Western forces have led to fighting in many urban areas, such as industrial cities, slums, and even refugee camps (Hills, 2004). Conducting military operations in urban areas poses a number of challenges due to the increased interactivity compared with other areas such as jungles or deserts.

Second, the very public statements of the leaders of the two opposing sides of the war with terror/on terror, Osma bin Laden, and George W. Bush, avoid the political narrative of war. They have openly embraced eschatological philosophies in their calls for global jihad and a just war against evil.

Usually, the construction of the narrative is related to questions of social and political power. But it is much more so in the case of the Good and Evil narratives as a method of persuasion through the identification of a dialectical relationship between Islamic State (ISIS) terrorist communication and Western governments’ counterterrorism rhetoric as reflected in government reports, statements, speeches, and audio-visual material. The concept of narrative can contribute to the theory and research of the phenomena of terrorism, political violence, and radicalization, offering new tools for the further development of key constructs such as identity, emotions, and culture (Pemberton and Aarten 2017, 2).

The third problem for advocates of political philosophy, and one that Clausewitz never faced, is a war involving the exchange of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are designed to deter and discourage potential adversaries. It was commonly thought that while nuclear weapons were not capable of producing reasonably significant military effects, they were nevertheless extremely capable of producing political effects. Arguments of great nuclear power are irrelevant unless they are linked to a counter-force strategy or risky assurances that, in general, courageous leaders are taking risks they would not normally take if they acted alone. The slow, steady proliferation of nuclear weapons is likely to continue. But in the case of Clausewitz’s war, the use of nuclear weapons breaks the relationship between war (nuclear) and reasonable state activity.

Finally, facing the revolutionary war that calls for counter-revolutionary responses, obeying Clausewitz’s advice not to unnecessarily destroy the adversary’s military forces becomes problematic not only because those forces are indistinguishable from the local population, but also because that there is no certainty that these forces have been eliminated “unless we are prepared to destroy a good part of the population” (Rapoport, 1968, 53). This attempt to ensure the insignificance of the revolutionary ideology in question is problematically
in collision with the political purpose of the war, that is, it violates Clausewitz’s basic rule that war is the extended arm of politics.

When looking at the literature of those scholars who wish to dismiss Clausewitz’s views as inappropriate for modern warfare, it becomes apparent that their critique misrepresents Clausewitz’s thinking in two fundamental ways: (1) that Clausewitz’s theory of war is state-centric and (2) that changes in the ways of warfare are equal to changes in the nature of war (i.e., warfare as opposed to war). Both are false and are probably based on a misreading of Clausewitz’s “On War.”

The view of the Clausewitz trinity as (1) people, (2) military, and (3) government points to an inherently state-centric view of war - an attitude that has taken root in the highest echelons of the military (and academic) thinking. This interpretation, however, is based on the so-called secondary trinity, which Clausewitz used as a mere illustration of the functions of the more important, yet chronically neglected primary trinity. The primary trinity seeks to capture the nature of war as a broad phenomenon in the paradoxical but fully interconnected spectrum. In the words of Clausewitz (1976, 89) war is a real chameleon that adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon, its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity - composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which should be considered a blind natural force; the game of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and its element of subordination, as an instrument of politics, which makes it subject only to a reason.

Clausewitz’s most vocal critics have taken his secondary trinity as the basis of what must be a completely state-centric theory of war. Martin van Creveld, most importantly, identifies Clausewitz’s theory as being based entirely on the secondary trinity, and thus the state, calling the concept a Trinitarian war before declaring it immaterial (Van Creveld 1991). But, as he writes, these narrow interpretations harm Clausewitz, whose work is far more universal. When the primary trinity is taken as a framework, the type of actor - state, non-state, tribal - becomes a matter of secondary importance (Smith, 2005), because Clausewitz’s primary trinity has nothing to do with the socio-political nature of the warring entity, because basically, all actors in war are subject to violence, coincidence, and rational purpose. In other words, because Clausewitz’s primary trinity focuses on the basic, intangible aspects of war as a broad phenomenon, material considerations, such as the type of actor, do not affect the applicability of the framework (Lonsdale, 2016). That is why wars with non-state actors, which have a tribal or sectarian character, still fall under the umbrella of Clausewitz’s theory of war.

Another criticism comes from the new military school of thought, which argues that current developments in military affairs reflect fundamental changes in the nature of warfare that break with Clausewitz’s old concept. The post-Cold War world has shifted from interstate war to intra-communal violence and irregular confrontations, as well as huge technological advances. The problem
with Clausewitz’s misunderstanding, in this case, comes from classifying guerrilla methods and low-intensity warfare as a mere tactic in warfare, not as separate categories of war. Second, technological change does not affect the nature of war as much as it does the context of war. These two points of change, the irregularity of the conflict and technological progress, therefore, do not touch on the nature of war, but on the eternally changing nature of warfare. Proponents of the new school of war thinking tend to confuse war with warfare: the latter is subject to constant change, the former is not.

C) In defense of the relevance of Clausewitz’s political philosophy, we also emphasize the position of General Rupert Smith, who says that in today’s war, civilians are at war, that is, the war is between people. The purpose of using military force is to influence the intentions of the people. That is why he cannot agree when Clausewitz is denied, and his trinity as unimportant, because the experiences of national and international conflicts have shown that without the three elements - state, army, and people - a successful military operation cannot be carried out. The Clausewitz trinity of state, army, and people is a useful tool for analyzing the purpose and activities of actors, even though they are sometimes not state. Even formless non-state actors are dependent on and connected to people, who will have (an organization of) an armed force of some kind and will have some political direction to use force. And in such an environment, the focus must be shifted from destruction to communication, the purpose of which will be to influence the will of the people. Guided operations must then be conducted under the narrative of the vigilant mass media and thus influence the dependence of events. Also, the military must be used within an appropriate legal framework and not operate outside the law (Smith, 2005: 277, 303, 379).

3. Cultural, legal, and political approach to defining war

Whenever of the above philosophical approaches is chosen to understand warfare will lead the analysis in the opposite direction to the others. In international relations and security studies, warfare is defined in ways that emphasize the cultural, legal, and political dimensions.

Cultural approach: warfare looks different and has different meanings, depending on where and historically when is analyzed. War “is always an expression of culture, often determined by cultural forms, in some societies it is culture itself” (Keegan 1994: 12). What we members of one culture define as an act of warfare may not coincide with how members of another culture view the same thing.

How can we study modern warfare through the lens of culture? Different armies fought in different ways for reasons that do not seem very rational regardless of the cultural context. When different cultural systems collide, the

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4 The ritualized tribal war of New Guinea in the twentieth century to us is more like a school game - avoid the ball - than a battle, but it would probably have been very familiar to the Mycenaean Greeks of the Iliad.
results can be devastating for one side until that side adjusts. Culture is a nebulous notion that is always changing: It would be great to be able to talk about a single American culture or an unchanging Arabic, but unfortunately, the world is more complicated than that. Changes in culture within the same society can lead to dramatic battlefield results, such as mass recruitment in the past. If we do not recognize how culture influences why people fight, we will not be able to recognize the wars that are coming until it is too late. And, if we do not see how cultures shape the way people fight, we will not be able to win those wars when they come.

Legal approach. The generally accepted view is that war is an open and declared conflict between the armed forces of two or more states or nations. Legally, war is defined as “a legal condition that allows two or more enemy groups to engage in armed conflict” (Wright 1983, 7). It is clear that in this view, war differs from peace because it is a state of legal competition by military means. But this does not mean that war is synonymous with military conflict. The parties may be legally at war, but without undue violence between them. War is not just an action, but a position or condition in which nations are said to be at war not only when their armies are engaged, that is, in the very act of conflict, but also when they have any question of controversy or dispute which there is among them what they are determined to decide by the use of force and have publicly declared, or by their acts their determination to resolve it. National wars are said to be offensive or defensive. War is offensive by that government that commits the first act of violence; it is defensive by that government that receives such activity, but it is very difficult to say what the first act of violence is. If a nation sees itself as threatened by an attack, its first act of violence to prevent such an attack will be considered defensive. Because the international legal framework is defined according to states, the analysis of war only through a legal prism does not refer to armed conflicts when the warring parties are not states or when the government of a particular state considers the activities of domestic adversaries to be criminal activity.

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5 For example, during the Mongols’ initial invasion of Japan in 1274, the samurai challenged the invaders to a single battle, only to discover with disastrous results that the Mongols did not share their idea of how (with dignity and honor) a battle should be fought.

6 Thus, for example, the cultural shift created by French revolutionary ideals enabled France to mobilize a massive civilian army of recruits en masse; invoking the different cultural ideals of traditional authority, unlike other European monarchies that could not mobilize their subjects in the same way. The result was the success of the French in preventing the combined forces of other European powers, and even defeating them under Napoleon, until these others adopted similar reforms. If we do not understand that political culture influences the fight against war, we would be confused why France, which for centuries struggled for hegemony in Europe, was suddenly able to do so. Similarly, we could not understand why ISIS used a suicide bombing and the Kurds did not, or how Russia managed to support the Syrian regime.

7 An example of this is the relations between North and South Korea after the secession and hostilities in 1953.
This begs the question: does war still exist in the eyes of international law? In the actual sense of hostilities involving the use of armed force between states, the war still exists and there are rules of international law governing it. But it is less obvious, however, whether the war continues to exist as a legal state, a creation that automatically produces certain legal consequences for both the warring parties and other states. Although there have been a number of post-World War II hostilities, some of them at a high level, there has been no formal declaration of war and only a few of those conflicts have been classified as “war”. But that does not mean simply that “today the term war is out of date”. Exploration of the current significance of the concept of war includes issues essential to the prohibition of the threat of use of force or the use of force in Article 2 (4) of the Charter in times of heightened will to use force as a foreign policy instrument.

The political approach is the most popular approach that defines war as a specific type of political activity that involves violence. Sorel (1912) defines war as “a political act by which states, unable to adjust the dispute over their obligations, rights or interests, resort to armed force to decide which is stronger and can therefore impose its will to the other”. According to Hadley Bull (1977, 178), it is organized violence by political units against each other. Violence is not war if it is not fought in the name of a political unit, killing in war is different from murder because of its official character, the symbolic responsibility of the unit that kills. Also, violence committed in the name of a political unit is not war if it is not directed against another political unit as in the case of state violence in executing criminals or preventing pirates because it is directed against individuals.

Conclusion

In international relations and security studies, warfare is defined in ways that emphasize the cultural, legal, and political dimensions. Most thinkers of war tend to treat warfare as an independent process that ultimately operates under its own laws. Clausewitz’s theory of war has been accused of increasing irrelevance in understanding modern forms of warfare, such as civil war and non-state conflicts. Clausewitz’s critique of war theory is based on two false assumptions: (1) that Clausewitz thought is inherently state-centric and (2) that changes in warfare are equivalent to changes in the nature of war (i.e., warfare versus war). Critics have taken Clausewitz’s secondary trinity (people, military, government) as the cornerstone of Clausewitz’s theory while neglecting the critically important primary trinity (passion, chance, reason). Proponents of the new school of war thinking tend to confuse war with warfare: the latter is subject to constant change, the former is not. The possibility of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of groups dedicated to conducting terrorist spectacles without any specific demands is also a break with the Clausewitz tradition. The concept of narrative can contribute to political violence and radicalization by of-
fering new tools for the further development of key constructs such as identity, emotions, and culture.

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